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QUESTION PRESENTED
Is this common law nuisance suit non-justiciable
under the political question doctrine?
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici curiae, listed below, are law professors who
teach, research, and write about environmental law,
constitutional law, and torts. They have an interest in
preserving the courts’ traditional authority to adjudicate
common law claims involving the environment. Most
participated as amici in two similar nuisance cases in the
Courts of Appeals, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d
855 (5th Cir. 2009), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th
Cir. 2010), and Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil
Corp., appeal pending, No. 09-17490 (9th Cir.). Amici file
this brief as individuals and not on behalf of the
institutions with which they are affiliated.1
Randall S. Abate is Associate Professor of Law at
Florida A&M University College of Law.
Denise E. Antolini is Professor of Law and Director of
the Environmental Law Program at the University of
Hawai‘i at Mānoa, William S. Richardson School of Law.
William W. Buzbee is Professor of Law, Director of the
Environmental and Natural Resources Law Program, and
Director of the Center on Federalism and Intersystemic
Governance at Emory Law School.
Federico Cheever is Professor and Associate Dean for
Academic Affairs at the University of Denver, Sturm
College of Law.
The parties have consented to the filing of this brief in letters on file
in the Clerk’s office. No counsel for any party authored this brief in
whole or in part, and no person or entity, other than amici, their
counsel, and their institutions, made a monetary contribution
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.

1
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Jamison E. Colburn is Professor of Law at Penn State
University.
Robin Kundis Craig is Associate Dean for
Environmental Programs and Attorneys’ Title Professor of
Law at the Florida State University College of Law.
Holly Doremus is Professor of Law at the University of
California, Berkeley, School of Law.
Daniel Farber is Sho Sato Professor of Law at the
University of California, Berkeley, School of Law.
Robert L. Glicksman is J.B. & Maurice C. Shapiro
Professor of Environmental Law at George Washington
University Law School.
Oliver A. Houck is Professor of Law at Tulane
University Law School.
David Hunter is Associate Professor of Law and
Director of International and Comparative Environmental
Law at American University, Washington College of Law.
Alice Kaswan is Professor of Law at the University of
San Francisco School of Law.
Alexandra B. Klass is Associate Professor of Law at
the University of Minnesota Law School.
Sarah Krakoff is Associate Dean for Research and
Professor of Law at the University of Colorado Law
School.
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JoEllen Lind is Professor of Law and Associate Dean
for Faculty Development at Valparaiso University School
of Law.
Patricia Ross McCubbin is Professor of Law at
Southern Illinois University School of Law.
Jeffrey G. Miller is Professor of Law and Vice Dean for
Academic Affairs at Pace University School of Law.
Kenneth M. Murchison is James E. and Betty M.
Phillips Professor at Louisiana State University, Paul M.
Hebert Law Center.
Hari M. Osofsky is Associate Professor of Law,
Associate Director of Law, Geography & Environment,
Consortium on Law and Values in Health, Environment
& the Life Sciences, and Adjunct Associate Professor of
Geography at the University of Minnesota.
Patrick A. Parenteau is Professor of Law and Senior
Counsel, Environmental and Natural Resources Law
Clinic, at Vermont Law School.
Robert V. Percival is Robert F. Stanton Professor of
Law and Director of the Environmental Law Program at
the University of Maryland School of Law.
Zygmunt J.B. Plater is Professor of Law at Boston
College Law School.
Mary Christina Wood is Philip H. Knight Professor
and Faculty Director, Environmental and Natural
Resources Law Program, at the University of Oregon
School of Law.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Under the political question doctrine, certain
constitutional issues are reserved to the political branches
for decision. The doctrine has no application to common
law claims like the one in this case. The Court should
reject petitioners’ invitation to extend the doctrine far
beyond its traditional limits.
A. In every case in which the Court has found federal
jurisdiction lacking because of the political question
doctrine, the plaintiff’s claim has been founded on the
Constitution. Meanwhile the Court has addressed a great
many common law issues over the years, without ever
suggesting, much less holding, that any of them might be
political questions. This sharp distinction is not a mere
matter of labeling. It is a fundamental divide
necessitated by the very nature of the political question
doctrine, which is rooted in the Constitution’s separation
of powers. The six formulations established in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), are tools for dividing
constitutional claims between the competence of the
courts and the political branches. They have never had
any bearing on common law claims, which are always
within the competence of courts.
B. Whenever a constitutional issue that is nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine has arisen
within a lawsuit under the common law, the Court has
deferred to the political branches’ resolution of the
constitutional issue, but has nevertheless always retained
jurisdiction over the common law case and decided it on
the merits. In such cases the Court has never decided
that the common law claim itself is non-justiciable.
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C. There is no reason to accept petitioners’ invitation
to expand the political question doctrine far beyond its
traditional confines. A legal issue is not converted into a
political question simply because one might have policy
grounds for preferring that it be resolved by another
branch of government. Even if this nuisance suit will be
as novel and complex as petitioners allege, their concerns
can be addressed the way such concerns have always been
addressed, through the courts’ interpretation of the
common law of nuisance.
II. Even if the political question doctrine applied to
non-constitutional issues, this nuisance claim would not
be a political question. None of the six Baker
formulations is inextricable from this case. The authority
to resolve common law nuisance claims is neither
textually nor implicitly committed to either Congress or
the President.
A. This nuisance claim is not textually committed to
the political branches. The Constitution does not commit
to the political branches the exclusive power to resolve
nuisance claims, to adjudicate environmental disputes, or
to address the question of climate change. If there is any
constitutional text authorizing one of the branches to
decide this case, it is Article III, which explicitly provides
that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity.”
B. This nuisance claim is governed by judicially
discoverable and manageable standards. Petitioners
argue that because the law of nuisance incorporates a
broad reasonableness standard rather than a set of
precise rules, there will be no “right” or “wrong” answers
in this case. But that is an argument that would make
political questions out of all nuisance cases, not just this
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one. Indeed, all of the Court’s prior nuisance cases were
governed by the very same standards that petitioners
claim are undiscoverable in this case.
An issue does not become non-justiciable merely
because it is governed by a broad standard like
reasonableness. An issue is non-justiciable when it is
governed by no standard at all. When the applicable
standard is merely broadly worded or incapable of being
reduced to bright line rules, the Court has consistently
refused to hold that an issue is a political question.
C. This nuisance claim can be decided without an
initial policy determination of the kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion. This Baker formulation prevents
courts from making only those policy determinations that
are clearly within the exclusive power of the executive
branch, involving matters like which nation has
sovereignty over disputed territory, and it proscribes only
decisions explicitly setting forth the policy of the United
States on a particular matter. It does not bar courts from
making the implicit policy judgments they traditionally
make in common law cases.
D. None of the remaining Baker formulations is
inextricable from this case. A court applying the common
law would not express any lack of the respect due to the
political branches. The common law of nuisance cannot
override any decisions already made by the political
branches. And there is no possibility of inconsistent
pronouncements by the judiciary and another branch,
because the other branches can always displace the
common law of nuisance.
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A. ARGUMENT
The political question doctrine limits judicial review of
certain constitutional claims that are committed to the
political branches. The Court has never held, or even
suggested, that the doctrine forecloses judicial review of
common law claims like the one in this case. And even if
the political question doctrine limited judicial
consideration of common law claims, the claim in this case
would not be a political question.
I. The Political Question Doctrine Has No
Application to Issues of Common Law.
The political question doctrine has no application to
issues of common law, like the nuisance claim in this case.
The doctrine is a judicial gloss on the Constitution’s
separation of powers, under which there are certain
constitutional issues that the Constitution reserves,
textually or implicitly, to the political branches for
decision. The common law, by contrast, is the province of
the judiciary, which is the only branch with the authority
to interpret the common law.
The Court has always adhered to this distinction
between constitutional claims and common law claims. In
every case in which the Court has found federal
jurisdiction lacking because of the political question
doctrine, the plaintiff’s claim has been founded on a
provision of the Constitution. The Court has decided
many common law issues, but it has never suggested that
any of them were non-justiciable under the political
question doctrine. Perhaps the clearest evidence of this
sharp distinction can be found in the cases in which a
non-justiciable constitutional issue has arisen within a
lawsuit under the common law, as an element of the
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plaintiff’s or the defendant’s case. In such cases, the
Court’s consistent practice has been to defer to the
political branches’ resolution of the constitutional issue,
but nevertheless to retain jurisdiction and to decide the
common law issue on the merits. Common law issues are
never political questions.2
There is no reason to accept petitioners’ invitation to
expand the political question doctrine far beyond its
traditional confines. Petitioners’ concerns can be
addressed the traditional way, through the courts’
interpretation of the common law of nuisance.
A. This Court Has Never Found a Common Law
Claim Non-Justiciable Under the Political
Question Doctrine.
In every case in which the Court has found federal
jurisdiction lacking because of the political question
doctrine, the plaintiff’s claim has been a constitutional
claim. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004)
(plurality opinion) (Article I and Equal Protection Clause);
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (Impeachment
Trial Clause); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (Due
Process Clause); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)
(Article V); Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist.,
281 U.S. 74 (1930) (Guarantee Clause); Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (Tenth Amendment);
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917)
(Guarantee Clause); Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241
2

Respondent Tennessee Valley Authority is only half right in
observing that “this case differs from most cases presenting a political
question: Plaintiffs are not asking the courts to enforce a
constitutional or another external standard or norm that is typically
in the domain of nonjudicial actors.” TVA Br. at 39-40. In fact, this
case differs from all of this Court’s prior such cases.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss2/5

Banner and May: American Electric Power Company, Inc. v. State of Connecticut: Br

2012]

Amicus Brief

475

U.S. 565 (1916) (Guarantee Clause); Kiernan v. City of
Portland, 223 U.S. 151 (1912) (Guarantee Clause); Pacific
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912)
(Guarantee Clause); Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548
(1900) (Guarantee Clause and Due Process Clause);
Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. 50 (1867) (Constitutional
challenge to Reconstruction Acts).
Common law issues, by contrast, are never political
questions. The Court has addressed a great many
questions of common law over the years, without any
suggestion that any of them might be non-justiciable as
political questions. Many of these have been common law
nuisance cases. Some have involved disputes that raised
scientifically complex and politically sensitive questions of
environmental policy, including the appropriate levels of
pollution in the Atlantic Ocean, the Great Lakes, and the
Mississippi River. New Jersey v. City of New York, 283
U.S. 473 (1931) (Atlantic Ocean); Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (Lake Michigan); Ohio v.
Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971) (Lake Erie);
Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (Mississippi
River). Yet the Court has never even suggested, much
less held, that these common law nuisance claims might
be political questions. Rather, the Court has affirmed
that the federal courts have jurisdiction to decide them.
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 98, 108; Ohio v.
Wyandotte Chems., 401 U.S. at 495-96; New Jersey v. New
York, 283 U.S. at 476; Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. at
241.
As the Court held in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals, in
light of this long history, “precedent leads almost
ineluctably to the conclusion that we are empowered to
resolve this dispute.” 401 U.S. at 496. The case involved
Ohio’s effort to stop several Canadian and American
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chemical companies from dumping mercury into streams
that reached Lake Erie. It involved extraordinarily
difficult factual questions concerning whether Ohio
residents had experienced any actual harm and the extent
to which the defendants had contributed to that harm.
“We already know,” the Court explained,
that Lake Erie suffers from several sources of
pollution other than mercury; that the scientific
consensus that mercury is a serious water
pollutant is a novel one; that whether and to what
extent the existence of mercury in natural waters
can safely or reasonably be tolerated is a question
for which there is no firm answer; and that
virtually no published research is available
describing how one might extract mercury that is
in fact contaminating water.
Id. at 503-04. The Court recognized that “Ohio is raising
factual questions that are essentially ones of first
impression to the scientists.” Id. at 504. The Court
acknowledged that it lacked jurisdiction over suits “that
seek to embroil this tribunal in ‘political questions.’” Id.
at 496. Nevertheless, the Court concluded, “[t]hat we
have jurisdiction seems clear enough.” Id. at 495. The
Court declined to exercise its discretionary original
jurisdiction – not because the case presented a political
question, but because an ordinary trial court would be
better suited to adjudicate the case in the first instance.
Id. at 505. See also Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 108
(declining to exercise original jurisdiction over nuisance
suit, but remitting the case “to an appropriate district
court whose powers are adequate to resolve the issues”).
Further evidence that the political question doctrine
applies only to constitutional issues can be found in
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Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Soc’y, 478
U.S. 221 (1986), a case in which wildlife conservation
groups alleged that federal statutes required the
Secretary of Commerce to take action against Japan for
exceeding its annual quota of whales under an
international treaty. The defendants argued that the
issue – although statutory rather than constitutional –
was a non-justiciable political question because it was so
closely connected with foreign relations. The Court
disagreed; it held that an issue of statutory interpretation
does not present a political question. “[I]t goes without
saying that interpreting congressional legislation is a
recurring and accepted task for the federal courts,” the
Court explained. “[U]nder the Constitution, one of the
Judiciary’s characteristic roles is to interpret statutes,
and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely because
our decision may have significant political overtones.” Id.
at 230. See also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516
(2007) (finding no political question where “[t]he parties’
dispute turns on the proper construction of a
congressional statute, a question eminently suitable to
resolution in federal court”). The interpretation of the
common law, like the interpretation of statutes, is a
traditional and characteristic function of the courts. Only
constitutional issues can be political questions.3

3

In Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333
U.S. 103 (1948), the Court determined that the Civil Aeronautics Act
did not authorize judicial review of certain orders of the Civil
Aeronautics Board regarding overseas air transportation. While the
Court cited some of the same separation-of-powers concerns that
motivate the political question doctrine, id. at 111, the decision rested
on the Court’s interpretation of the statute, not on the political
question doctrine. Id. at 106 (“This Court long has held that statutes
which employ broad terms to confer powers of judicial review are not
always to be read literally”).
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For this reason, the Court has described the doctrine
as one that can deprive a federal court of jurisdiction over
constitutional claims, not other kinds of claims. United
States Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 458
(1992) (“In invoking the political question doctrine, a
court acknowledges the possibility that a constitutional
provision may not be judicially enforceable”); Webster v.
Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 612-13 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“we have found some constitutional claims to be beyond
judicial review because they involve ‘political questions’”).
Commentators have likewise consistently described
the political question doctrine as one that applies only to
constitutional issues. Laurence Tribe, for example,
summarizes the political question doctrine as one that
requires “federal courts to determine whether
constitutional provisions which litigants would have
judges enforce do in fact lend themselves to interpretation
as guarantees of enforceable rights.” Laurence H. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law 385 (3d ed. 2000). As Tribe
explains, “[a]n issue is political not because it is one of
particular concern to the political branches of government
but because the constitutional provisions which litigants
would invoke as guides to resolution of the issue do not
lend themselves to judicial application.” Id. at 370.
See also Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, et al.,
13C Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction and
Related Matters § 3534.3 (3d ed.) (“Challenges to official
action or inaction are the stuff of the separation-of-powers
concerns that underlie political-question reasoning”);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 147 (5th ed.
2007) (defining the doctrine as requiring “that certain
allegations of unconstitutional government conduct
should not be ruled on by the federal courts”); Jesse H.
Choper, “The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested
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Criteria,” 54 Duke L.J. 1457, 1458 (2005) (defining the
doctrine as stating “that courts should abstain from
resolving constitutional issues that are better left to other
departments of government”); Rachel E. Barkow, “More
Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy,” 102 Colum.
L. Rev. 237, 239-40 (2002) (“Underlying the political
question doctrine . . . is the recognition that the political
branches possess institutional characteristics that make
them superior to the judiciary in deciding certain
constitutional questions”); Mark Tushnet, “Law and
Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation
and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine,” 80
N.C. L. Rev. 1203, 1207 (2002) (“For the political question
doctrine, the ‘issue,’ in the Court’s sense, is: Who gets to
decide what the right answer to a substantive
constitutional question is?”); Martin H. Redish, “Judicial
Review and the ‘Political Question,’” 79 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1031, 1031 (1985) (“The so-called ‘political question’
doctrine postulates that there exist certain issues of
constitutional law that are more effectively resolved by
the political branches of government and are therefore
inappropriate for judicial resolution”); Louis Henkin, “Is
There a ‘Political Question’ Doctrine?”, 85 Yale L.J. 597,
599 (1976) (“a political question is one in which the courts
forego their unique and paramount function of judicial
review of constitutionality”); Tribe, supra, at 367
(“Professor Henkin is clearly right that one should not
accept lightly the proposition that there are provisions of
the Constitution which the courts may not independently
interpret”).
Amici Law Professors try to avoid this sharp
distinction between constitutional issues and common law
issues by insisting that all of the Court’s “cases presenting
political questions are predicated on causes of action that
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are, like tort actions, justiciable in other instances.” Brief
for Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 23. What they do not mention is that every
such political question has involved a constitutional
claim. The fact that some constitutional claims are nonjusticiable has no bearing on whether any common law
claims are non-justiciable.
Petitioners rely heavily on language from Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Pet. Br. at 46, but they have
plucked that language out of context. In Baker, the Court
lists several “formulations” describing when prior cases
had found an issue non-justiciable. Among these are “a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it,” and “the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion.” 369 U.S. at 217. These
“formulations,” however, are relevant to deciding which
constitutional questions should be deemed non-justiciable.
They have no bearing on questions of common law. The
Court makes that clear in the very next paragraph of
Baker, which explains that courts should refer to these
formulations in determining “whether some action
denominated ‘political’ exceeds constitutional authority.”
Id. Baker itself involved a claim under the Equal
Protection Clause. All the Court’s subsequent cases
applying the Baker formulations have likewise involved
constitutional claims. Vieth, 541 U.S. 267 at 277-78
(plurality opinion) (Article I and Equal Protection Clause);
Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228 (Impeachment Trial Clause);
United States Dep’t of Commerce, 503 U.S. at 456 (Article
I); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 389-90
(1990) (Origination Clause); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.
109, 121-22 (1986) (Equal Protection Clause); County of
Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 248-50
(1985) (Indian Commerce Clause); INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 940-42 (1983) (Article I); Powell v. McCormack,
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395 U.S. 486, 518-19 (1969) (Article I). The Baker
formulations are a tool for dividing constitutional claims
between the competence of courts and the political
branches. They have no relevance to common law claims,
because common law claims are always within the
competence of courts.
This distinction between constitutional issues and
common law issues is not a mere matter of labeling or
“semantic cataloguing,” Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. It is a
fundamental divide necessitated by the very nature of the
political question doctrine. At bottom, “[t]he
nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a
function of the separation of powers.” Id. at 210. The
Constitution’s text commits certain tasks to branches
other than the judiciary. Its structure may so commit
others. But the adjudication of common law cases is at
the core of the judiciary’s constitutional role. It is
committed to the judiciary both textually, in the words of
Article III (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,
in Law and Equity”), and structurally, in the relationship
of Article III to Articles I and II, neither of which
authorizes the other branches to do anything remotely
similar. As the Court has explained, “[t]he judicial
Power” created by Article III is “the power to act in the
manner traditional for English and American courts.”
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 (plurality opinion). Nothing could
be more traditional than the adjudication of a common
law case, the judiciary’s core function since long before the
Constitution was enacted.
There are two sound prudential reasons for this clear
line between constitutional and common law issues.
First, when courts interpret the Constitution, they are the
final arbiters. The political branches cannot undo what
the courts have done. The separation-of-powers concerns
underlying the political question doctrine are thus at their
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strongest, because the political branches cannot provide a
check on judicial action. When courts interpret the
common law, by contrast, the political branches can
override their rulings at any time. In such cases, the
political branches themselves can police the judiciary.
The separation-of-powers concerns that lie behind the
political question doctrine are substantially weaker.
Second, if the political question doctrine applied to all
issues, not just constitutional issues, the doctrine would
cease to be “a delicate exercise in constitutional
interpretation,” Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. If the doctrine
were to lose its constitutional grounding, it would lack
any limiting principle. It would become a free-floating
discretionary power of federal courts to disclaim
jurisdiction over factually complex or politically sensitive
cases. But of course federal courts have no such power.
They must hear even the most difficult cases brought
before them. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, 130 S. Ct. 584, 590 (2009);
Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 298 (2006); Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).
B. When a Non-Justiciable Constitutional Issue
Has Arisen Within a Common Law Claim,
the Court Has Always Taken
Jurisdiction and Decided the Common Law
Claim on the Merits, After
Deferring to the Political Branches’
Resolution of the Constitutional Issue.
Constitutional issues sometimes arise within lawsuits
brought under the common law, as parts of either the
plaintiff’s or the defendant’s case. Sometimes those
constitutional issues are non-justiciable as political
questions. In such cases, the Court’s uniform practice has
been to defer to the political branches’ resolution of the
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non-justiciable constitutional issue, but nevertheless to
take jurisdiction and decide the common law claim on the
merits. The Court has never decided that the common
law claim itself is non-justiciable.
The best-known example is Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S.
1 (1849). Although Luther is usually remembered for
holding that Guarantee Clause claims are non-justiciable,
the case itself was an action for trespass, for breaking and
entering a house. Id. at 34. The plaintiff was one of the
participants in the Dorr Rebellion; the defendants were
officers of the established “charter” government of Rhode
Island, which was attempting to suppress the rebellion.
Id. As part of the plaintiff’s case, he argued that the
charter government lacked lawful power – that the rebel
government was the real one – and that the defendants
thus had no authority to enter his house. Id. at 38. It
was this particular argument that the Court found nonjusticiable, on the ground that the political branches have
the sole power to determine whether a state government
is genuine. Id. at 39-43. But the Court did not find the
case non-justiciable as a whole. The Court did not
dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. Rather, the
Court decided the case on the merits. The case had been
tried below to a jury, which had returned a verdict for the
defendants. Id. at 18. This Court affirmed that
judgment. Id. at 47. The plaintiff’s argument about the
true government of Rhode Island was non-justiciable, but
his common law action for trespass was justiciable.4

4

Amici Consumer Energy Alliance et al. summarize Luther
incorrectly. Brief of Amici Curiae Consumer Energy Alliance et al. at
21. The Court did not hold that the common law trespass claim in
Luther was non-justiciable. The Court decided that issue on the
merits.
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Every time a political question has arisen within a
common law case, the Court has likewise deferred to the
political branches on the political question but has
decided the case on the merits. Oetjen v. Central Leather
Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) (suit for replevin decided on the
merits, after deferring to the political branches as to
which was the legitimate government of Mexico, an issue
the Constitution exclusively commits to the political
branches); Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884)
(suit for breach of contract decided on the merits, after
deferring to the political branches on the question of
whether to make treasury notes legal tender, an issue the
Constitution exclusively commits to the political
branches); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. 635 (1853) (suit for
ejection decided on the merits, after deferring to the
political branches as to the validity of a treaty, an issue
the Constitution exclusively commits to the political
branches); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. 415 (1839)
(action of assumpsit decided on the merits, after deferring
to the political branches as to which government had
jurisdiction over the Falkland Islands, an issue the
Constitution exclusively commits to the political
branches). As the Court explained in Juilliard, the
wisdom of using one sort of currency or another “is a
political question, to be determined by congress when the
question of exigency arises, and not a judicial question.”
110 U.S. at 450. Nevertheless, the Court held, “[t]here
can . . . be no doubt of the jurisdiction of this court” over
the breach of contract claim. Id. at 436.
When a political question arises within a nonconstitutional case, the Court’s consistent practice has
thus been to take jurisdiction of the case, despite
deferring to the political branches on the political
question. The Court explained this consistent practice in
Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
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Ricaud was a suit in equity to recover lead bullion
imported from Mexico. One element of the plaintiff’s case
was the allegation that the ostensible government of
Mexico, the source of the defendant’s title, was in fact not
the legitimate government of Mexico. The Court held that
because the United States had recognized that
government as legitimate, the judiciary could not decide
the question anew. It was a question constitutionally
committed to the political branches. The Court continued:
“This last rule, however, does not deprive the courts of
jurisdiction once acquired over a case.” Id. at 309. The
resolution of the political question by the political
branches “must be accepted by our courts as a rule for
their decision.” Id. Nevertheless, “[t]o accept a ruling
authority and to decide accordingly is not a surrender or
abandonment of jurisdiction but is an exercise of it.” Id.
The Court proceeded to decide the case on the merits.
Amicus Chamber of Commerce correctly notes that
the Court has “refused to adjudicate political questions
even when such questions arise in the context of private
litigation involving common law.” Brief Amicus Curiae of
the Chamber of Commerce at 17. The important thing,
however, is that when a political question has arisen
within a common law case, the Court has not dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Court has exercised
jurisdiction and decided the case on the merits.
An issue of common law, therefore, can never be nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine. Only
constitutional claims can be non-justiciable as political
questions. Because the present case involves a common
law claim of nuisance, the political question doctrine is no
bar to the federal courts’ exercise of jurisdiction.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 [2012], Art. 5

486

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

C. There is No Reason to Expand the
Political Question Doctrine to Include
Common Law Claims.
Petitioners are not arguing that there is a
constitutional provision requiring federal courts to defer
to the political branches on some element of the case, such
as the validity of a treaty or the authenticity of a
government. Rather, they are arguing that the entire
case itself is non-justiciable. They are urging the Court to
expand the political question doctrine far beyond its
traditional confines. But even if this nuisance suit will be
as novel and complex as petitioners allege, such a radical
departure from precedent is hardly necessary.
Petitioners’ concerns can be addressed the traditional
way, through the courts’ interpretation of the common law
of nuisance.
A legal issue is not converted into a political question
simply because one might have policy grounds for
preferring that it be resolved by another branch of
government. Those policy concerns can be addressed in
many other ways, none of which would require twisting
the political question doctrine beyond recognition. As the
leading treatise on the federal courts explains:
Traditional use of the political-question label
stops short of embracing all the myriad
circumstances in which courts conclude that a
particular problem is better addressed by another
branch. A decision not to create a new commonlaw cause of action, for example, may well rest on
a sense that the subject is better suited to
legislative or even administrative action, without
even pausing to think of political-question
doctrine.
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Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, et al., 13C Federal
Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction and Related Matters
§ 3534.3 (3d ed.). If there are pressing reasons
respondents should not prevail in their nuisance suit,
they are reasons of nuisance law, and they can be
addressed by a decision on the merits. There is no need
for a drastic expansion of the political question doctrine.
Petitioners’ own amici demonstrate that the courts have
had no trouble rejecting innovative nuisance suits on the
merits, by applying the substantive law of nuisance. Brief
of Amici Curiae National Federation of Independent
Business Small Business Legal Center et al. at 10-12.
And if Amici’s arguments are correct, the courts will have
no trouble doing the same here. Id. at 12-27.
Under the common law of nuisance, respondents will
have to prove that the pollution produced by petitioners
“is an unreasonable interference with a right common to
the general public.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §
821B(1). If the questions of causation and harm in this
case are in fact as intractable as petitioners allege,
respondents will not be able to prove their case. Among
the circumstances a court will have to consider are
“[w]hether the conduct involves a significant interference
with the public health” and “whether the conduct . . . has
produced a permanent or long-lasting effect.” Id., §
821B(2). If such matters are as fraught with uncertainty
as petitioners contend, respondents will not be able to
sustain their burden of proof.
In making these determinations, courts will be doing
what they have always done: they will be adapting the
common law of nuisance to new problems. New
technologies have always given rise to new and difficult
questions of nuisance law, and courts have always been
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able to develop the common law, case by case, in response
to these new questions. When the earliest railroads were
assailed as nuisances, for example, courts did not dismiss
the suits for lack of jurisdiction, on the theory that only
the political branches were equipped to make the difficult
policy determinations of how many railroad lines the
nation should have and where they should be located.
When the railroads won, they won on the merits. E.g.,
Lexington & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Applegate, 38 Ky. 289
(1839). Industrialization did not cause courts to treat
nuisance suits against factories as political questions, on
the theory that industrial policy was a new and complex
subject best left to the political branches. When the
factories won, they won on the merits. Paul M. Kurtz,
“Nineteenth Century Anti-Entrepreneurial Nuisance
Injunctions – Avoiding the Chancellor,” 17 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 621 (1976). When air pollution first became an
important policy concern, courts did not dismiss nuisance
suits against polluters, on the theory that there were no
right or wrong answers to the question of how clean the
air ought to be. E.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230 (1907). When the polluters won, they won
on the merits. These were issues that in their day were
just as controversial and just as difficult, in both a legal
and a scientific sense, as climate change is today. Yet
courts were able to perform their traditional task of
accommodating the law of nuisance to new circumstances.
In the end, petitioners’ argument concerning the
political question doctrine is, as Justice Holmes put it in a
similar context, “little more than a play on words.” Nixon
v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927). Climate change is a
“political question” in the colloquial meaning of the
phrase, in the sense that it is a question that has
produced political controversy. But so were school
desegregation, and abortion, and capital punishment, and
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scores of other issues over which the federal courts have
exercised jurisdiction. It is this colloquial sense of the
phrase that Tocqueville had in mind when he wrote that
“[t]here is almost no political question in the United
States that is not resolved sooner or later into a judicial
question.” Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America
257 (Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop eds.,
2000). The legal definition of a “political question,”
however, is much narrower than its colloquial definition.
Under the legal definition, a common law claim of
nuisance has never been considered a political question,
and there is no reason to start doing so now.
The Court should instead hew closely to the political
question doctrine’s limited reach. After all, the doctrine is
a creation of the courts themselves. The only boundaries
to the doctrine are found in the Court’s own cases. Once
those boundaries are burst, there would be no principled
limit to the doctrine’s expansion.
II. This Nuisance Claim Would Not Be a
Political Question Even if the Political
Question Doctrine Applied to Issues of
Common Law.
Petitioners’ argument rests on the erroneous
assumption that the political question doctrine applies to
non-constitutional issues. Pet. Br. at 46-51. But even if
their assumption were correct, the nuisance claim in this
case would not be a political question.
The Court’s political question jurisprudence has
consisted of careful, case-by-case inquiries into “whether
the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its
breach judicially determined, and whether protection for
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the right asserted can be judicially molded.” Baker, 369
U.S. at 198. In Baker, the Court analyzed its prior cases
and found six common “formulations” among the issues it
had found to be political questions. Id. at 217.
“Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question,” the Court determined, is either:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3]
the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a
court’s undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or [5] an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or [6] the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one
question.
Id. Dismissal is warranted only if at least one of these six
elements is “inextricable” from the case. Id.
A plurality of the Court has suggested that these
formulations “are probably listed in descending order of
both importance and certainty.” Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278
(plurality opinion).
None of the six Baker formulations is “inextricable”
from this case.
A. This Nuisance Claim is Not Textually
Committed to the Political Branches.
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The most important and easily discernible of the
Baker formulations is whether there is “a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
This Baker formulation requires explicit constitutional
language, not inference from the Constitution’s structure
or from the capacities of the three branches.
The text of the Constitution does not assign the
resolution of common law nuisance claims like this one to
the legislative or executive branches. Petitioners do not
even try to argue that it does. Articles I and II say
nothing about any exclusive power of the political
branches to resolve nuisance claims (or indeed any
common law claims), to adjudicate environmental
disputes, or to address the question of climate change.
The Commerce Clause has never been understood to
deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over cases involving
interstate or international commerce. Article III, by
contrast, explicitly states that “[t]he judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity.” U.S. Const. art.
III, § 2. If the Constitution textually commits this issue
to any branch, it is the judiciary.
This case is very different from the only two cases
since Baker in which the Court has found issues textually
committed to the political branches. In Nixon, the Court
determined that the trial of impeachments is textually
committed to the Senate, and thus that the Senate’s
choice of impeachment procedure is a political question.
Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229-33. The basis for this decision was
Article I, Section 3, Clause 6, which says very clearly that
“[t]he Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments.” Id. at 229. There is no comparable
constitutional text in this case.
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In Gilligan, the Court found that the organization and
discipline of the National Guard is textually committed to
Congress. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 6-9. The basis for this
decision was Article I, Section 8, Clause 16, which says
that Congress has the power “[t]o provide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining, the militia.” Id. at 6. There is
no comparable constitutional text to govern this case.
None, that is, except for Article III, which commits the
issue to the courts.
B. This Nuisance Claim is Governed by
Judicially Discoverable and Manageable
Standards.
Petitioners rely almost entirely on the second Baker
formulation, whether there is “a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards,” Baker, 369 U.S.
at 217, for resolving this case. Pet. Br. at 46-51. They
argue that because the law of nuisance is governed by a
reasonableness standard rather than a set of precise
rules, there will be no “right” or “wrong” answers in a
nuisance case. Id. at 48. But an issue does not become a
political question merely because it is governed by a broad
standard like reasonableness. An issue is a political
question when it is governed by no standard at all.
This nuisance case is a political question, petitioners
argue, because the judge who decides it will “‘search[ ] in
vain . . . for anything resembling a principle in the
common law of nuisance.’” Pet. Br. at 48 (quoting Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1055
(1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Amici Consumer
Energy Alliance et al. likewise worry that “[p]ublic
nuisance law operates at such a high level of generality as
to provide no meaningful notice or consistent standard of
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application.” Brief of Amici Curiae Consumer Energy
Alliance et al. at 28.
But this is an argument that would make political
questions out of all nuisance cases, not just this one. A
legal issue does not transform into a political question
simply because it is governed by a reasonableness
standard. If it did, not only would every nuisance case
become a political question, but so would the vast swaths
of the law – from negligence to the Fourth Amendment –
that also require courts to determine what is reasonable.
So would the great many constitutional issues that
involve equally broad standards, like whether
punishment is “cruel and unusual,” or whether
congressional action is “necessary and proper.” The fact
that the law of nuisance cannot be reduced to a set of
discrete principles, see Pet. Br. at 48, or an algorithm that
spits out “right” and “wrong” answers, see id., is thus
utterly beside the point. The law of nuisance may be
broadly worded, but it is hardly undiscoverable or
unmanageable.
The standards that will govern this case are in fact
discoverable. They can be discovered very easily, by
reading the Restatement of Torts. Courts have been
applying them for centuries, without any suggestion that
courts have been exceeding their jurisdiction all the while.
Indeed, all the Court’s prior nuisance cases – none of
which presented political questions – were governed by
the very same standards that petitioners claim are
undiscoverable in this case. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200
U.S. 496 (1906).5
5

Amici Law Professors argue that the Restatement provides no
standards where the alleged nuisance does not constitute a common
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An issue does not become a political question under
this Baker formulation merely because it is governed by a
broad standard like reasonableness. An issue is a
political question when it is governed by no standard at
all. In Vieth, for instance, the plurality determined that
political gerrymandering claims are non-justiciable, not
because they require courts to apply a broad standard like
reasonableness, but because courts had been unable to
articulate any meaningful standard whatsoever. Vieth,
541 U.S. at 278-90 (plurality opinion). In Coleman, the
Court found that a claim under Article V was nonjusticiable, not because it was governed by a broad
standard like reasonableness, but because it was not
governed by any standard at all. Coleman, 307 U.S. at
450-54. See also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1003
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment)
(concluding that a Senator’s challenge to the President’s
abrogation of a treaty is non-justiciable, because while the
Constitution sets forth the manner in which the Senate
participates in the ratification of treaties, it provides no
standards for the Senate’s participation in their
abrogation).

law crime. Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 27. Now that common law crimes are virtually
nonexistent, however, this is an argument that would make political
questions out of virtually all nuisance cases. The TVA argues that
only the political branches can provide standards for resolving
common law nuisance cases. TVA Br. at 39 n.17. But this is an
oxymoron: if courts were applying standards prescribed by another
branch, they would no longer be applying the common law. In
common law cases, whether nuisance or any other kind, courts have
always discovered the applicable standards within the common law
itself.
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Where the governing standard is merely broadly
worded or incapable of being reduced to bright line rules,
by contrast, the Court has consistently refused to hold
that an issue is a political question. In Munoz-Flores, for
example, the government argued that claims under the
Origination Clause are political questions, because it
would be impossible for courts to fashion manageable
standards to govern the issue. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at
395. This Court disagreed. “[T]he Government suggests
no reason that developing such standards will be more
difficult in this context than in any other,” the Court
explained. “Surely a judicial system capable of
determining when punishment is ‘cruel and unusual,’
when bail is ‘[e]xcessive,’ when searches are
‘unreasonable,’ and when congressional action is
‘necessary and proper’ for executing an enumerated power
is capable of making the more prosaic judgments
demanded by adjudication of Origination Clause
challenges.” Id. at 395-96. These are issues governed by
standards at least as broad as the law governing
nuisance, yet there has never been doubt that federal
courts have jurisdiction to decide them. See also Baker,
369 U.S. at 226 (finding reapportionment claims
justiciable because “[j]udicial standards under the Equal
Protection Clause are well developed and familiar”).
This nuisance claim might involve a more complex
chain of causation than others, but this is a difference
that has nothing to do with the existence of judicially
discoverable standards. The standards that will be
applied to this case are exactly the same as the ones that
courts have always applied to nuisance cases. A more
complex chain of causation might make this nuisance case
more difficult to prove under the substantive law of
nuisance, but the substantive law is no different.
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C. This Nuisance Claim Can Be Decided Without
an Initial Policy Determination of the Kind
Clearly for Nonjudicial
Discretion.
Petitioners claim, in a single sentence, that deciding
this case will require “initial policy decisions” by judges.
Pet. Br. at 51. Amici Law Professors argue that judges
will have to make implicit policy judgments about the
social benefits of various methods of producing energy,
about the fairness of imposing emission limits on
petitioners but not their competitors, and about whether
petitioners should bear the burden of doing their share to
remedy a harm also caused by many others. Brief for
Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 24-25.
Under Baker, however, a political question is one that
requires judges to make a particular kind of policy
decision – the kind “clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”
369 U.S. at 217. As Baker made clear, such policy
decisions involve matters such as which nation has
sovereignty over disputed territory, or whether a war has
ended. Id. at 212-13. Policy decisions like these are
clearly for the executive branch, not the judiciary. And as
Baker made equally clear, the Court was referring to overt
policy decisions, decisions explicitly setting forth the
policy of the United States on a particular matter, like
whether to recognize a foreign government. Id. The
Court was not referring to the implicit policy decisions
courts make while deciding common law cases.
This case will not require judges to make policy
decisions that purport to represent the official policy of
the United States on any matter, much less policy
decisions that are clearly reserved to the political
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branches. Judges will have to decide only a legal
question: whether petitioners are committing a common
law nuisance harmful to respondents. That alone is
enough to render this Baker formulation inapplicable.
Nor will this case require judges to step out of their
judicial role to make implicit policy decisions that are
“clearly for nonjudicial discretion.” The policy
determinations required by common-law decision-making
are ones that have traditionally been within the province
of the courts: they are not “clearly” relegated to
“nonjudicial discretion.” Many legal issues have policy
implications of one kind or another. At least since Oliver
Wendell Holmes (and probably well before), it has been
commonplace to observe that judges, in the course of
deciding cases, are in effect making policy decisions, even
if they do not explicitly say that is what they are doing.
In that sense, judges deciding all nuisance cases can be
said to make policy decisions. In even the simplest of
nuisance cases, such as a suit to enjoin a factory from
polluting, a judge might have to weigh the harm from
pollution against the cost to the community of the lost
employment from the factory. Such judgments are not
the kind of policy decisions “clearly for nonjudicial
discretion.” They are the kind of policy decisions judges
make every day. If this case involves a political question,
so does much of the normal work of the courts.
It is thus hardly surprising that neither petitioners
nor their amici can cite a single case in which this Court
has found a political question simply because an issue has
important policy implications. There are no such cases.
It is breathtakingly overbroad to suggest that the courts
lack jurisdiction whenever Congress has authority – even
untapped – to regulate a matter of interstate or
international commerce. See Brief Amicus Curiae of
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Pacific Legal Foundation at 28-32; Brief Amicus Curiae of
Cato Institute at 26-28. If that were true, federal judges
would have very little to do.
This case may involve a more complex chain of
causation than the typical nuisance case. But that
difference has nothing to do with whether the case
requires “an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion.” Rather, it has to do with the
burden respondents will have to shoulder under the
substantive law of nuisance. The fact that petitioners are
not the only entities causing the alleged harm, for
example, is a fact that a court will have to consider on the
merits, in deciding whether respondents have sustained
their burden of proof. It is not a fact that has any bearing
on whether this issue is a political question.
The same is true of the fact that this nuisance suit
will have a greater geographical scope than others the
Court has adjudicated. Cf. Brief for American Chemistry
Council et al. at 14-18. That might make this case harder
to prove on the merits, but it has no bearing on whether
the federal courts have jurisdiction to decide it. The
political question doctrine is about the nature of the
issues in a case, not about the scope of the litigation or the
number of parties to it. The mere size and complexity of a
case do not have constitutional relevance. If they did, the
political question doctrine would have no principled limit:
it would swallow all kinds of complex litigation.
D. None of the Remaining Baker
Formulations Is Present.
Petitioners do not assert the existence of the fourth,
fifth, or sixth Baker formulations. None is inextricable
from this case. A court applying the common law would
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not express a “lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of the government.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. Any common
law decision a court reaches could effectively be undone
by the political branches. A decision in this case would be
no more disrespectful to the other branches than a
decision in any other common law case.
For the same reasons, this case does not involve “an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made,” or “the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.” Id. The common
law of nuisance cannot override any decisions already
made by the political branches. And there is no
possibility of embarrassment from inconsistent
pronouncements by the judiciary and another branch,
because the other branches can always displace the
common law of nuisance.
Because none of the six Baker formulations is
“inextricable” from this case, this nuisance claim would
not be a political question even if the political question
doctrine applied to issues of common law.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be
affirmed.
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